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Abstract
The nonlocal behavior of quantum mechanics can be used to generate guaranteed fresh
randomness from an untrusted device that consists of two nonsignalling components; since the
generation process requires some initial fresh randomness to act as a catalyst, one also speaks
of randomness expansion.
Colbeck and Kent proposed the first method for generating randomness from untrusted
devices, however, without providing a rigorous analysis. This was addressed subsequently by
Pironio et al. [Nature 464 (2010)], who aimed at deriving a lower bound on the min-entropy of
the data extracted from an untrusted device, based only on the observed non-local behavior of
the device. Although that article succeeded in developing important tools towards the acquired
goal, it failed in putting the tools together in a rigorous and correct way, and the given formal
claim on the guaranteed amount of min-entropy needs to be revisited.
In this paper we show how to combine the tools provided by Pironio et al., as to obtain a
meaningful and correct lower bound on the min-entropy of the data produced by an untrusted
device, based on the observed non-local behavior of the device. Our main result confirms the
essence of the improperly formulated claims of Pironio et al., and puts them on solid ground.
We also address the question of composability and show that different untrusted devices can
be composed in an alternating manner under the assumption that they are not entangled. This
enables for superpolynomial randomness expansion based on two untrusted yet unentangled
devices.
1 Introduction
Background. One of the counter-intuitive features of quantum mechanics is its non-locality:
measuring possibly far apart quantum systems in randomly selected bases (chosen out of some
given class) may lead to correlations that are impossible to obtain classically. Anticipated by
Einstein, Rosen and Podolsky [EPR35], it was John Bell [Bel64] who put this property on firm
ground by proposing an inequality that is satisfied by any classical correlation, but is violated
when the correlation is obtained from measuring entangled quantum states. Such inequalities are
called Bell inequalities.
An important example of such a Bell inequality was proposed by Clauser Horne, Shimony
and Holt [CHSH69] and states that if X and Y are independent uniformly distributed bits, and
if the bit A is obtained by “processing” X without knowing Y , and the bit B is obtained by
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“processing” Y without knowing X, then the probability that A⊕B = X ∧Y is at most 75%. This
bound on the probability holds if the processing is done classically with shared randomness, but
can be violated when the processing involves measuring an entangled quantum state; in this latter
case, a probability of roughly 85% can be achieved.
Violating a Bell inequality necessarily means that there must be some amount of fresh random-
ness in the outputs A and B (given the inputs X and Y ). More formally, consider an untrusted
device D, prepared by an adversarial manufacturer Eve. The device consists of two components,
set up by Eve, which on respective inputs X and Y produce respective outputs A and B without
communicating. No matter how the two components work, as long as a given Bell inequality is
violated during n sequential interactions with D (which can be observed by doing statistics), there
must be a certain amount of uncertainty in the n output pairs (A1, B1), . . . , (An, Bn), even given
the n input pairs (X1, Y1), . . . , (Xn, Yn), and thus it should be possible to apply a randomness
extractor to obtain nearly-random bits.
This kind of randomness expansion from untrusted devices was first suggested by Colbeck [Col09]
and Colbeck and Kent [CK11], who presented a scheme that uses GHZ states and reaches a linear
expansion, however, without providing a rigorous security analysis. The main point missing in
these works is a method to rigorously bound the min-entropy of a device’s output. The work of
Pironio et al. [PAM+10] addresses this issue, and they propose a technique to numerically compute
a lower bound on the min-entropy of the output pair AB (conditioned on X and Y ) as a function
of the Bell value of the device D (which quantifies the violation of Bell inequality). For the special
case of CHSH, they also show an analytical bound.
The authors of [PAM+10] also consider the case of n sequential interactions with D, and they
show how to estimate the average Bell value of D over the n rounds by doing statistics over the
observed data. This is non-trivial because the Bell value of D may change over the different rounds,
and, for each round, it may depend on the behavior of the previous rounds. In other words, the Bell
value of D during round i+1 depends on the history (A1, B1,X1, Y1), . . . , (Ai, Bi,Xi, Yi). Combin-
ing things, Pironio et al. then claim to have a bound on the min-entropy of (A1, B1), . . . , (An, Bn),
conditioned on (X1, Y1), . . . , (Xn, Yn), as a function of the observed data, i.e., as a function of
(A1, B1,X1, Y1), . . . , (An, Bn,Xn, Yn). However, such a statement does not make sense, since the
considered min-entropy is a value determined by the experiment description (which specifies the
probability distribution), whereas the claimed bound depends on the specific outcome of the ex-
periment.1 Furthermore, not only is the claim improperly formulated, but there is also a flaw in
its derivation, which is without an obvious fix. Thus, even though the necessary tools are pro-
vided in [PAM+10], they are not put together in the right rigorous way to be able to control the
min-entropy of (A1, B1), . . . , (An, Bn) produced by an untrusted device D.
Our Result. In this paper, we make up for this shortfall in [PAM+10]. Specifically, we show
how to rigorously and correctly put together the tools provided in [PAM+10] in order to obtain
a meaninful (and correct) bound on the min-entropy of (A1, B1), . . . , (An, Bn), conditioned on
(X1, Y1), . . . , (Xn, Yn), by means of the observed data. The trick is to consider and bound the
min-entropy conditioned on the event that the estimator for the average Bell value lies in some
interval. This gives us some control over the average Bell value of the device, but, as we show, still
leaves enough uncertainty in the data to get a good bound on its min-entropy.
1This is like saying that the min-entropy of throwing a fair die is lower bounded by the result of the throw: the
former equals log(6) ≈ 2.6, whereas the latter is a random number in {1, . . . , 6}. Trying to bound the min-entropy
conditioned on the observed outcome makes no sense either, because this conditional min-entropy obviously vanishes.
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We also address the question of the composability of untrusted devices, and we show that
under the assumption that different devices are not entangled, the output of one device, after
privacy amplification, can be used as input for a second device, and the resulting output of the
second device, after privacy amplification, can again be fed into the first device, etc. Using an
extractor with a short seed for doing the privacy amplification, this allows for a superpolynomial
randomness-expansion scheme using two untrusted (but guaranteed-to-be unentangled) devices.
Concurrent and RelatedWork. In concurrent and independent work, Vazirani and Vidick [VV11]
as well as Pironio and Massar [PM11a] came up with results that are overlapping with ours. We
briefly discuss here the similarities and the differences between our results and those of Vazirani
and Vidick and of Pironio and Massar. We encourage the reader to also look at the comparisons
given in [VV11, PM11a].
Vazirani and Vidick obtain a randomness-expansion scheme with superpolynomial expansion
and security against quantum side information. We do not achieve security against quantum
side information, and our superpolynomial randomness-expansion scheme requires two unentangled
devices in an iterative way, whereas their scheme works with just one single device. On the other
hand, their result is tailored to CHSH and requires an almost full violation of Bell inequality, while
our result is generic and holds for any Bell inequality, and we show that any violation leads to some
amount of fresh randomness.
Pironio and Massar’s results on the other hand are very similar to ours, and only differ in some
minor details.2
In a very recent preprint, Barrett, Colbeck and Kent point out the possibility of Trojan-horse
attacks on device-independent randomness-expansion protocols [BCK12, Appendix]. It seems im-
possible to prevent that Eve programs devices (that are used multiple times) to release in later
rounds information about previous outputs. We note that although such an attack seems unavoid-
able, in a single activation of our randomness-expansion scheme (see [FGS11, Section 5] for details),
we can re-use the same devices over and over again and still prevent such a Trojan-horse attack by
only releasing the output of the very last round (and aborting if things go wrong before the last
round is reached).
2 Preliminaries
We assume the reader is familiar with quantum information processing, and we merely fix our
notation and some basic concepts in this section. Throughout the paper, all logarithms are base 2.
2.1 Quantum States
The state of a quantum system A is given by a density matrix ρA, i.e., a positive-semidefinite
trace-1 matrix acting on some Hilbert space HA. We denote the set of all such matrices, acting on
HA, by D(HA). The state space of the joint quantum systems AB, which consist of two (or more)
subsystems A and B , is given by the tensor product HAB = HA ⊗ HB. If the state of the joint
system is given by ρAB, then the state of the sub-system A when considered as a “stand alone”
system is given by the reduced density matrix ρA = trB(ρAB) ∈ D(HA), obtained by tracing out
system B.
2As a historical note, previous versions of their [PM11b] and our paper [FGS11] claimed security against quantum
side information, but both proofs were incorrect.
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A random variable X over a finite set X with probability distribution PX can be represented by
means of the density matrix as ρX =
∑
x PX(x)|x〉〈x| ∈ D(HX), where {|x〉}x∈X forms a basis of
HX = C|X|. Thus, we may view X as a quantum system, and we say that its state, ρX , is classical.
If the state of a quantum system E depends on the random variable X, in that the state of E is
given by ρxE ∈ D(HE) if X = x, then we can view the pair XE as a bi-partite quantum system
in state ρXE =
∑
x PX(x)|x〉〈x| ⊗ ρxE ∈ D(HX ⊗ HE). This naturally extends to multiple random
variables and quantum systems.
The distance between two states ρE , ρ˜E ∈ D(HE) is measured by their trace distance 12‖ρE − ρ˜E‖1,
where ‖ · ‖1 is the L1 norm.3 In case of classical states ρX and ρ˜X , corresponding to distributions
PX and P˜X , the trace distance coincides with the statistical distance
1
2
∑
x |PX(x)− P˜X(x)|.
2.2 Closeness to Uniform, Min-Entropy, and Extractors
In the following definitions, we consider a bi-partite system XE with classical X, given by ρXE . X
is said to be random and independent of E if ρXE = ρU ⊗ ρE , where ρU is the fully mixed state on
HX (i.e., U is classical and, as random variable, uniformly distributed).
Definition 2.1. The distance to uniform of X given E is d(X | E) := 12‖ρXE − ρU ⊗ ρE‖1.
If Ω is some event, determined by the random variable X, then d(X | E ,Ω) is naturally defined
by means of replacing the distribution PX by PX|Ω. The same applies to the next two definitions.
Definition 2.2. The guessing probability of X given E is
Guess(X | E) := sup
{Mx}x
∑
x
PX(x)tr(Mx ρ
x
E),
where the supremum is over all POVMs {Mx}x on HE .
Definition 2.3. The min-entropy of X given E is given by Hmin(X | E) := − log Guess(X | E).
This definition was shown in [KRS09] to coincide with the definition originally introduced by
Renner [Ren05] which also coincides with the classical definition of conditional min-entropy, in the
case where E is classical.
Definition 2.4. A function Ext : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}ξ is a (k, εext)-strong extractor, if for
any bipartite quantum system XE with classical X and with Hmin(X | E) ≥ k, and for a uniform
and independent seed Y , we have d
(
Ext(X,Y )
∣∣ Y E) ≤ εext .
Note that we find “extractor against quantum adversaries” a too cumbersome terminology; thus
we just call Ext a (strong) extractor, even though it is a stronger notion than the standard notion
of a (strong) extractor.
2.3 Bell-Inequality and CHSH
For given finite sets A,B,X,Y, consider a conditional probability distribution PAB|XY , specified
as follows. There exists ρAB ∈ D(HA⊗HB) for an arbitrary (finite) dimensional two-partite
quantum system AB, and families of measurements {Max} and {N by}, indexed by x ∈ X and y ∈ Y,
acting on A and B, and with measurement outcomes a ∈ A and b ∈ B, respectively such that
PAB|XY (a, b | x, y) = tr
(
(Max ⊗N by) ρAB (Max ⊗N by)†
)
for all (a, b, x, y) ∈ A× B× X× Y.
3Defined by ‖A‖1 := tr(
√
A†A), where A† denotes the Hermitian transpose.
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Definition 2.5 (Bell Value). For any set C = {cabxy} of Bell coefficients, the Bell value of PAB|XY
(with respect to C) is defined as
I(PAB|XY ) =
∑
abxy
cabxyPAB|XY (a, b | x, y)
PAB|XY is called classical (or local) if there exist (conditional) probability distributions PR,
PA|XR and PB|Y R such that PAB|XY (a, b | x, y) =
∑
r PR(r)PA|XR(a | x, r)PB|Y R(b | y, r) for all
a, b, x, y; this is equivalent to requiring that PAB|XY can be specified by means of a separable state
ρAB. We let I0 denote the maximal Bell value achievable (for a given set of Bell coefficients) with
a classical PAB|XY . We speak of a violation of Bell inequality if there exists a quantum system
resulting in conditional probability distribution with a Bell value greater than I0.
For instance, for so-called CHSH Bell coefficients [CHSH69], given by cabxy = (−1)xy(−1)a⊕b
for a, b, x, y ∈ {0, 1}, it is known that I0 = 2, but I = 2
√
2 is possible for a quantum system.
3 Fresh Randomness from Untrusted Devices
In this section, we recall (some of) the findings of [PAM+10], and also discuss and fix some subtle
issue that got neglected there. Throughout this and the upcoming sections, we consider fixed finite
sets A,B,X,Y, and a fixed set C = {cabxy} of Bell coefficients. The reader may think of CHSH, but
our results hold generally.
3.1 A Single Interaction
We consider an untrusted deviceD, prepared by an adversary Eve. As discussed in the introduction,
D consists of two components,4 which, on respective inputs x ∈ X and y ∈ Y, produce respective
outputs a ∈ A and b ∈ B without communicating. Formally, D’s behavior is given by an unknown
conditional probability distribution PAB|XY , which is specified by an unknown quantum state ρAB ∈
D(HA⊗HB) of unknown dimension, and unknown families of measurements {Max} and {N by}, acting
on the respective systems A and B. We are interested in the guaranteed amount of uncertainty in
A and B (conditioned on X and Y ), under the promise that PAB|XY has some given Bell value,
greater than I0. This motivates the following definition.
Definition 3.1. For a given set of Bell coefficients, we define h◦ to be the function
h◦(I) = inf
HA,HB,ρAB
{Max},{N
b
y}
min
x∈X
y∈Y
Hmin(AB | X=x, Y =y)
where the outer infimum is over all finite dimensional Hilbert spaces HA and HB, all states ρAB ∈
D(HA⊗HB), and all families of measurements {Max} and {N by} such that the resulting conditional
probability distribution PAB|XY (a, b | x, y) = tr(Max ⊗M by ρABMax † ⊗M by †) has Bell value at least I.
Also, we define h to be the convex closure of h◦, i.e., the maximal convex function that does not
exceed h◦.
5
Pironio et al. [PAM+10] show that by means of a hierarchy of semi-definite programs (SDPs)
[NPA07, NPA08], h◦(I) can be numerically computed up to arbitrary precision (by means of a pos-
sibly expensive computation). They also show an analytical lower bound of 1− log(1+√2− I2/4)
4The results derived here apply also to devices with three or more components, including the three-component
devices used by [CK11].
5Formally, h(I) = max f(I) where the maximum is over all convex functions f which are upper bounded by h◦.
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for h◦(I) in the case of CHSH, which reaches 1 for I = Imax = 2
√
2 (whereas the numerical cal-
culation gives h◦(2
√
2) ≈ 1.23), and monotonically decreases to 0 as I goes down to I0 = 2; see
Figure 2 in [PAM+10]. Since this lower bound is convex, it is also a lower bound on h;6 we will
need this later on. For now, we can conclude that if an unknown bipartite quantum system (with
fixed measurements {Max} and {N by}) is promised to have a CHSH value of I = 2
√
2, then the joint
min-entropy in the measurement outcomes A and B is lower bounded by approximately 1.23 bits
(respectively 1 bit, if one wants to rely on the analytical bound).
3.2 Sequential Repetitions
In order to get more uncertainty, and in order to be able to estimate the Bell value, we consider a
sequential repetition of extracting uncertainty from an untrusted device D as above. Informally,
rather than interacting withD once (i.e., inputting (x, y) ∈ X×Y and observing (a, b) ∈ A×B),D is
interacted with n times in sequence, by inputting (x1, y1) ∈ X× Y and observing (a1, b1) ∈ A× B,
inputting (x2, y2) ∈ X × Y and observing (a2, b2) ∈ A × B, etc. This procedure is formalized as
follows.
Modeling. We consider an arbitrary but fixed bipartite state ρAB ∈ D(HA⊗HB) of an arbitrary
finite-dimensional bipartite quantum system AB, and a sequence of n arbitrary but fixed pairs of
families of measurements ({Ma1x1 }, {N b1y1 }), . . . , ({Manxn }, {N bnyn }).
For each pair, {Majxj } is a family of measurements, indexed by xj ∈ X, acting on A, with
measurement outcomes aj ∈ A, and similar for {N bjyj }. We allow the two components of the
device D to communicate between the rounds; this is captured by a sequence U2, . . . , Un of unitary
transformations acting on HA ⊗ HB, where Uj is applied to the (collapsed) state before the jth
interaction. For j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, denote with aj the concatenation of the first j rounds aj = a1 · · · aj
and the same for b, x and y. Let Aj , Bj,Xj , Y j be the corresponding random variables. To ease
notation, we use bold letters as shortcuts for the concatenation of all n rounds, e.g. a = an,A = An,
etc.
Formally, the conditional probability distribution PAB|XY is defined as
PAB|XY (a, b | x,y) =
n∏
j=1
PAjBj |XjYjHistj (aj , bj | xj, yj , histj)
where Histj = (A
j−1, Bj−1,Xj−1, Y j−1) and histj = (a
j−1, bj−1, xj−1, yj−1), and
PAjBj |XjYjHistj (aj , bj | xj , yj, histj) = tr
(
(M
aj
xj ⊗N bjyj ) ρAB|Histj=histj (M
aj
xj ⊗N bjyj )†
)
where ρAB|Histj=histj is inductively defined for j = 1, . . . , n as follows. ρAB|Hist1=hist1 = ρAB, and,
for 1 ≤ j < n,
ρAB|Histj+1=histj+1 = Uj+1
(M
aj
xj ⊗N bjyj ) ρAB|Histj=histj (M
aj
xj ⊗N bjyj )†
PAjBj |XjYjHistj (aj , bj | xj, yj , histj)
U †j+1
is the state obtained by applying Uj+1 to the state to which ρAB|Histj=histj collapses when A and
B are measured by {Majxj } and {N bjyj }, respectively, and aj and bj are observed.
What is important to realize is that before every round j, the situation is exactly as in the
previous Section 3.1, with a fixed state ρAB|Histj=histj and fixed measurements {M
aj
xj } and {N bjyj }
in the device D, and thus PAjBj |XjYjHistj (·, ·|·, ·, histj) here behaves as PAB|XY does in Section 3.1.
6Actually, the numerical computations for CHSH suggest that h = h◦; we do not know if this holds generally.
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We would like to point out that there is no need to make {Majxj } (and the same for {N bjyj })
dependent on previous in- and outputs, i.e., on histj using the above notation, because we may
assume that the measurement {Majxj } encodes xj and aj into the post-measurement state of A,
and that the subsequent unitary Uj+1 copies this (classical) information into the state of B. The
subsequent measurements can then be control measurements, which performs a measurement de-
pending on the history. Similarly, we may assume the {Majxj }’s to be identical for different j’s (and
the same for {N bjyj }’s), since the quantum system A may maintain a counter that is increased by
every unitary Uj , and {Majxj } can then be chosen as a control measurement that is controlled by
the counter.7
Given the conditional probability distribution PAB|XY as specified above, which describes the
input-output behavior of the n sequential interactions with the device D, once a distribution PXY
is decided upon, which specifies how the inputs xj and yj are chosen in each round, the joint
probability distribution PABXY is determined as PABXY = PXY PAB|XY .
Estimating the Bell value. Once the device D is given, i.e. the state ρAB, the measurements
({Ma1x1 }, {N b1y1 }), . . ., ({Manxn }, {N bnyn }) and the unitaries U2, . . . , Un are fixed, PA1B1|X1Y1 and thus
the Bell value of the first round of interaction, I1 = I(PA1B1|X1Y1), is determined. For the other
rounds, this is slightly more subtle. The reason is that the state ρAB|Hist2=hist2 before the second
round, and thus the probability distribution PA2B2|X2Y2,Hist2=hist2 , depends on what happened in
the first round, i.e., depends on hist2 = (a1, b1, x1, y1). Thus, the Bell value of the second round,
I2 = I(PA2B2|X2Y2,Hist2=hist2), is a function of hist2. Similarly, the Bell value of the j-th round,
Ij = I(PAjBj |XjYj ,Histj=histj), is a function of histj. We let
I¯ =
1
n
n∑
j=1
Ij (1)
be the average Bell value, averaged over the n rounds, and we write I¯ = I¯(a, b,x,y) to make its
dependency on the a, b etc. explicit.8
Pironio et al. show in [PAM+10] that the average Bell value I¯ can be estimated by analyzing
the data collected over the n rounds. Specifically, defining
Iˆ = Iˆ(a, b,x,y) =
1
n
n∑
j=1
∑
abxy
cabxy
χ(aj = a, bj = b, xj = x, yj = y)
PXY (x, y)
(2)
where χ(e) is the indicator of the event e (that is, χ(e) = 1 if the event e occurs and 0 otherwise),
the following holds.
Proposition 3.2 ([PAM+10]). For I¯ and Iˆ as above, for arbitrary but iid (X,Y ), meaning that
PXY =
∏
j PXjYj with PXjYj = PXY for all j, and for any ε > 0:
P
[
I¯(A,B,X,Y ) ≤ Iˆ(A,B,X ,Y )− ε
]
≤ exp
(
− ε
2n
2( cmax
pmin
+ Imax)
)
,
where Imax is the maximal value of I achievable by means of a quantum system, and pmin =
minx,y PXY (x, y) and cmax = max{cabxy}.
7These observations on the independence of the measurements on the history and the round are not crucial for
our proofs; they merely simplify the notation.
8Actually, it only depends on (an−1, bn−1, xn−1, yn−1).
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Thus, except with small probability, the estimated value Iˆ for the average Bell value is not
much smaller than the real average Bell value I¯. For a fixed choice of Bell coefficients C = {cabxy},
which uniquely determines Imax, we write c(pmin) =
ln 2
2 (
cmax
pmin
+ Imax)
−1, so that the probability in
Proposition 3.2 can be written as 2−c(pmin)ε
2n.
We stress that for Proposition 3.2 to hold, it is crucial that X and Y are chosen independently
of the internal state of D; this is implicit in the statement of Proposition 3.2 by having modeled
the internal state ρAB of D to be fixed and independent of X and Y : ρXY AB = ρXY ⊗ ρAB.
Obviously, if D knows X and Y in advance, then it can easily pretend to have a large Bell value
while, for instance, being classical.
Bounding the min-entropy. It remains to argue that if I¯ is non trivial, i.e. sufficiently greater
than I0, which can be learned by observing Iˆ (except with small probability), then the pair (A,B)
contains a linear (in n) amount of min-entropy. To this end, Pironio et al. show (see equation (A.5)
in [PAM+10]) that
PAB|XY (a, b | x,y) ≤ 2−n·h(I¯(a,b,x,y)) (3)
for all a, b,x,y. In the derivation, they use the fact that h is convex. From (3), they conclude (see
equation (A.9) in [PAM+10]) that Hmin(AB | X = x,Y = y) ≥ n · h(I¯) and thus ≥ n · h(Iˆ − ε)
except with small probability. However, this conclusion does not seem correct. What follows from
(3) is that
Hmin(AB |X=x,Y =y) ≥ n · h(I¯(an◦ , bn◦ ,x,y)) (4)
for the values an◦ and b
n
◦ that minimize the right-hand side of (4); but then, the right-hand side
of (4) is likely to be smaller than n · h(I¯(a, b,x,y)) or n · h(Iˆ(a, b,x,y)) for the values a and b
actually observed.9
For the remainder of this section, we propose and discuss a possible way to get a meaningful and
useful statement on the min-entropy of (A,B) in terms of h(I¯), and thus of h(Iˆ) except with small
probability. We partition the interval [I0, Imax] ⊂ R, ranging from the trivial—meaning classical—
Bell value I0 to the maximal value Imax, into m disjoint blocks: [I0, Imax] = Ω0 ∪ . . .∪Ωm−1, where
Ωℓ is of the form Ωℓ = [Jℓ, Jℓ+1), with the exception that Ωm−1 = [Jm−1, Imax], for some boundary
points I0 = J0 ≤ J1 ≤ · · · ≤ Jm−1 ≤ Imax. The value of m ∈ N and the (possibly different) sizes of
the Ωℓ’s are arbitrary but fixed.
For any parameter ε > 0, given the random variables A,B,X,Y , describing the n interactions
with the device D, we can now define the random variable Lε to be the unique random variable
that satisfies Iˆ(A,B,X ,Y )− ε ∈ ΩLε (with natural adjustments outside of the range [I0, Imax]).10
Theorem 3.3. Let (X ,Y ) be iid. Then, for any ε, δ > 0 there exists a “good” event G with
P [G] ≥ 1−m · 2−δn − 3 · 2−c(pmin)ε2n, and such that
Guess(AB |X=x,Y =y, Lε=ℓ,G) ≤ 2−n·h(Jℓ)+δn+1
and thus
Hmin(AB |X=x,Y =y, Lε=ℓ,G) ≥ n · h(Jℓ)− δn− 1
for all x ∈ Xn, y ∈ Yn and ℓ ∈ {0, . . . ,m− 1} with PXY Lε|G(x,y, ℓ) > 0.
9When approached with this issue, the authors of [PAM+10] confirmed that their formulation is improper, and they
mentioned that they have been aware of it and know how to solve it. In particular, their independent work [PM11a]
fixes this issue in a similar manner as we do here.
10The definition of Lε simply captures that if Iˆ is too close to the lower end of an interval, then we take the next
lower interval to be on the safe side.
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We would like to point out that for the bound on P [G] to hold, it is crucial that ρAB is
independent of (X,Y ) (and the (Xi, Yi)’s are iid): clearly, the device can fool you if it knows
the inputs it will get in advance. However, for the event G as defined in the proof below, the
bound on the guessing probability holds irrespectively of the distribution of X and Y . Indeed,
the value of Guess(AB | X = x,Y = y, Lε = ℓ,G) is determined by the conditional probability
distribution PAB|XY (·, ·|x,y) alone (which is determined by ρAB, the family of measurements and
the unitaries); this holds because Lε as well as G (this, we will see below) are uniquely determined
by A,B,X and Y .
Proof. Let Bguess be the bad event I¯(A,B,X ,Y ) ≤ Iˆ(A,B,X,Y ) − ε that the estimated Bell
value Iˆ is significantly larger than the average Bell value I¯, and let Gguess be its complement (which
we understand as a good event); by Proposition 3.2, we know that P [Bguess] ≤ 2−c(pmin)ε2n. We
define B1 to be the set of all “bad inputs” (x,y) with the property that
P [Bguess|X = x,Y = y] ≥ 1
2
;
it is straightforward to show that P [(X ,Y ) ∈ B1] ≤ 2 · 2−c(pmin)ε2n. Finally, we define B2 to be the
set of all (x,y, ℓ) with the property that
PLε|XY Gguess(ℓ|x,y) ≤ 2−δn .
It follows from the definition of B2 that P [(X ,Y , Lε) ∈ B2|Gguess] ≤ m · 2−δn. We slightly abuse
notation and identify the set B1 with the bad event (X,Y ) ∈ B1 and we write G1 for its com-
plementary good event, and correspondingly for B2 and G2. We now define the good event G as
G := Gguess ∧ G1 ∧ G2. Using union bound over the bad events, it is not too hard to show that
P [G] ≥ 1−m · 2−δn − 3 · 2−c(pmin)ε2n.
It remains to argue the bound on the min-entropy. Let a, b,x,y be such that I¯(a, b,x,y) >
Iˆ(a, b,x,y)− ε, i.e., they have positive probability conditioned on the good event Gguess. Further-
more, let ℓ be the unique value with Iˆ(a, b,x,y) − ε ∈ Ωℓ. If (x,y) 6∈ B1, then P [Gguess|X =
x,Y = y] ≥ 12 and hence, conditioning on the event Gguess can increase the probabilities by at most
a factor of 2. For those (x,y) 6∈ B1, it then follows from (3) that
PAB|XY ,Gguess(a, b | x,y) ≤ 2 · 2−n·h(I¯(a,b,x,y)) ≤ 2 · 2−n·h(Iˆ(a,b,x,y)−ε) ≤ 2 · 2−n·h(Jℓ) .
If additionally we have (x,y, ℓ) 6∈ B2, then
PAB|XY Lε,Gguess(a, b | x,y, ℓ) ≤
PAB|XY ,Gguess(a, b | x,y)
PLε|XY Gguess(ℓ | x,y)
≤ 2 · 2−n·h(Jℓ) · 2δn .
Note that additionally conditioning on G1 and G2 does not change the above conditional prob-
ability distribution if (x,y) 6∈ B1 and (x,y, ℓ) 6∈ B2. Thus, the same bound also applies to
PAB|XY Lε,G(a, b | x,y, ℓ), for all a, b,x,y and ℓ with PABXY Lε|G(a, b,x,y, ℓ) > 0. By defini-
tion of the guessing probability and the min-entropy, this proves the claim.
A specific example. Consider CHSH, so that the Bell value of a given device is expected to
be in the range from I0 = 2 to Imax = 2
√
2 ≈ 2.828. Let us divide this range into J0 = I0 < J1 =
2.2 < J2 = 2.4 < J3 = 2.6 < Imax, and let us take a q-biased input distribution PXY =
∏
j PXjYj
with PXjYj(0, 0) = 1− 3q and PXjYj(x, y) = q for all (x, y) ∈ {0, 1}2 \ {(0, 0)}, where 0 < q ≤ 1/4
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is some parameter. Finally, let us fix some small parameters ε, δ > 0; for concreteness, say that
ε = 0.05 and δ = 0.01.
Consider now n sequential interactions with an untrusted device D, where in each round xj and
yj are chosen (according to PXjYj ) and input into D, and aj and bj are obtained as output from D.
Let us say that from the collected data, we get Iˆ(a, b,x,y) = 2.7 ∈ Ω3 as estimation for the average
Bell value. By Theorem 3.3, he have that given x and y and Lε = 3, the min-entropy of a and b is
at least n ·(h(2.6)−δ)−1 ≈ n ·(0.36−δ) > n/3 bits, except with probability 4 ·2−δn+3 ·2−c(q)ε2n.11
Thus, when applying a suitable randomness extractor to a, b, we can extract, say, n/4 bits that
are exponentially close to uniformly distributed (given x and y and Lε = 3).
In order to sample the inputs according to the biased input distribution PXY , as suggested
in [PAM+10], it is known to be sufficient (in average) to have access to n · O(q log(1/q)) random
bits [KY76]. Since, q log(1/q) converges to 0 for q → 0, if q is chosen to be a small enough constant,
then, say, n/4 random bits are sufficient. Thus, by starting off with n/4 random bits,12 we obtained
another n/4 almost-random bits and thus hold now n/2 random bits. Thus, we have expanded the
randomness by a factor 2. Choosing q = O(1/
√
n), one obtains an expansion factor O(
√
n/ log n)
while still being negligibly close to perfect randomness (since c(1/
√
n) = Ω(1/
√
n)).
Having generated fresh randomness from an untrusted device D, one is now tempted to use the
newly obtained randomness to generate even more fresh randomness from the device D, and so on.
This does not work. The reason is that the generated randomness is not random to the device D,
or, more formally, not independent of the internal state of D; indeed, D has already observed x
and y and it has itself produced a and b. We argue below, however, that we can use the fresh
randomness to generate even more randomness from another device, as long as the devices are not
entangled with each other nor with the adversary.
Classical Side Information The case where the adversarial producer Eve of the devices holds
classical side information about the device D, can be reduced to the case without side information
by conditioning on particular values of the side information.
4 Composability
Consider two (or more) untrusted devices D and D′, prepared by the adversary Eve. We assume
that D and D′ cannot communicate and are not entangled with each other. The case when Eve
holds classical side information about the devices can be treated as described in the previous section.
We can then apply Theorem 3.3 to argue that the output AB produced by D has high min-entropy
(except with small probability) given the internal state of D′ (because D′ is independent of D),
assuming that a large enough average Bell value is observed. It thus follows that by applying an
extractor (with suitable parameters and a freshly chosen seed) to AB, we obtain a bitstring K that
is close to random and independent of the internal state of D′. This in particular implies that if we
use the randomness K to sample the input X ′Y ′ to D′ (according to a prescribed distribution),
then X ′Y ′ is close to independent of the internal state of D′. As the dependency between the
internal (quantum) state of D and the in-/outputs of D′ is purely classical, we can condition on
this classical information and apply Theorem 3.3 to argue that the output A′B′ produced by D′
has high min-entropy given the current internal state of D. Therefore, we are in the same situation
as above, and so can use the randomness extracted from A′B′ to sample again inputs for D, and
11This probability is on average over the execution; given a specific outcome for Iˆ(a, b,x,y), like 2.7 here, the
probability may be different.
12We are ignoring here the randomness needed for the extractor.
10
we can keep on going like this as long as a large enough Bell value is observed. We stress that for
the above line of reasoning only works because we assumed the devices D,D′ to be unentangled
to start with. In order to see quantitatively how this procedure can lead to a superpolynomial
randomness expansion, we refer to [FGS11, Section 5].
5 Conclusion and Open Problems
An interesting extension to our result is to generalize Theorem 3.3 to the setting of quantum side
information. This would allow a composition theorem for the more general case in which the devices
can be entangled with each other and with Eve. Numerical calculations seem to suggest that the
bound on the min-entropy does carry over to the quantum setting. Unfortunately, we are unable
at the moment to give a rigorous proof of this claim and leave it as main open question.
Acknowledgment
RG is grateful to CWI, Amsterdam for hosting him while part of this work was done. CS is
supported by a NWO VENI grant.
References
[BCK12] J. Barrett, R. Colbeck, and A. Kent. Prisoners of their own device: Trojan attacks on
device-independent quantum cryptography. ArXiv preprint arXiv:1201.4407, 2012.
[Bel64] J.S. Bell. On the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen paradox. Physics, 1(3):195–200, 1964.
[CHSH69] John F. Clauser, Michael A. Horne, Abner Shimony, and Richard A. Holt. Proposed
experiment to test local hidden-variable theories. Phys. Rev. Lett., 23:880–884, Oct
1969.
[CK11] Roger Colbeck and Adrian Kent. Private randomness expansion with untrusted devices.
Journal of Physics A: Mathematical and Theoretical, 44(9):095305, 2011.
[Col09] Roger Colbeck. Quantum And Relativistic Protocols For Secure Multi-Party Com-
putation. PhD thesis, University of Cambridge, November 2009. Arxiv preprint
arXiv:0911.3814.
[EPR35] A. Einstein, B. Podolsky, and N. Rosen. Can quantum-mechanical description of phys-
ical reality be considered complete? Phys. Rev., 47(10):777–780, May 1935.
[FGS11] S. Fehr, R. Gelles, and C. Schaffner. Security and composability of randomness expan-
sion from bell inequalities. ArXiv preprint arXiv:1111.6052v2, 2011.
[KRS09] Robert Ko¨nig, Renato Renner, and Christian Schaffner. The operational meaning of
min- and max-entropy. IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, 55(9):4337–4347,
2009.
[KY76] D. Knuth and A. Yao. Algorithms and Complexity: New Directions and Recent Results,
chapter The complexity of nonuniform random number generation. Academic Press,
1976.
11
[NPA07] Miguel Navascue´s, Stefano Pironio, and Antonio Ac´ın. Bounding the set of quantum
correlations. Phys. Rev. Lett., 98(1):010401, Jan 2007.
[NPA08] Miguel Navascue´s, Stefano Pironio, and Antonio Ac´ın. A convergent hierarchy of
semidefinite programs characterizing the set of quantum correlations. New Journal
of Physics, 10(7):073013, 2008.
[PAM+10] S. Pironio, A. Ac´ın, S. Massar, A. Boyer de la Giroday, D. N. Matsukevich, P. Maunz,
S. Olmschenk, D. Hayes, L. Luo, T. A. Manning, and C. Monroe. Random numbers
certified by bell’s theorem. Nature, 464(7291):1021–1024, April 2010.
[PM11a] S. Pironio and S. Massar. Device-independent randomness expansion secure against
quantum adversaries. ArXiv preprint arXiv:1111.6056, 2011.
[PM11b] S. Pironio and S. Massar. Device-independent randomness expansion secure against
quantum adversaries. ArXiv preprint arXiv:1111.6056v1, 2011.
[Ren05] Renato Renner. Security of Quantum Key Distribution. PhD thesis, ETH Zu¨rich
(Switzerland), September 2005. Arxiv preprint arXiv:quant-ph/0512258.
[VV11] U. Vazirani and T. Vidick. Certifiable quantum dice - or, testable exponential random-
ness expansion. ArXiv preprint arXiv:1111.6054, 2011.
12
